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1. Introduction 
 
Franchising is a relatively new phenomenon in the organizational economics and yet it has been 
rapidly expanding throughout the world in the last decades (Welsh et al., 2006). According to the 
estimations franchising generates $1 trillion worth of business in gross sales in the USA which is 
about 50% of U.S. retail trade (Swartz, 2001). In Canada franchising accounts for approximately 
25% of the retail trade (Welsh, 2002). In the U.K. the number of franchising systems has 
increased by 30% from 1994 to 1997 (Boyle, 1999). 
The popularity of franchising among firms is caused by different advantages that it brings, such 
as access to financial and managerial resources, ability to expand franchise network quickly etc. 
However, franchising requires a lot of efforts in the coordination of a network and there is still 
lack of theoretical knowledge about franchising that needs to be accumulated to reduce its risks 
for the firms. The popularity of franchising causes increased interest from the side of researchers 
and leads to the development of theories that would help companies to operate their franchise 
systems effectively benefiting from their advantages to a full extent. 
The way, in which a franchise network is coordinated and controlled, is one of the determinative 
factors for its success or failure. Methods of control used by franchisors can differ in the degree 
of their rigidity and the extent to which formal control is applied. The methods of control used 
depend on different internal and external characteristics of a franchise network. The following 
thesis concentrates on the choice of different methods of control in the franchise systems. It uses 
primarily agency and monitoring costs theories to explain how franchisors organize their systems 
of control and which factors influence their choice. The first part of the thesis gives an overview 
of the theories and research in the field of control methods used in franchising. The second part 
represents an empirical research of the use of control as allocation of decision rights in the 
franchise systems. The impact of some characteristics of franchise networks on the methods of 
control are considered in the empirical part of this work. In the end, results of the research and 
managerial implications are presented. 
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2. Definition of Franchising, its advantages and disadvantages 
 
2.1. What is Franchising? 
“Franchising is a special form of licensing in which the franchisor makes a total marketing 
program available, including the brand name, logo, products, and method of 
operation.”(Gillespie et al., 2004) “It entails a more integrated relationship between the parties 
involved compared with other forms of licensing.”(Fulop and Forward, 1997) Besides that, 
franchising suggests that a franchisor not only allows a franchisee to sell franchisor’s goods 
under his branded name, but also transfers to him the knowledge of a business format. “The 
franchisor should provide a proven method of operating, support and advice on the setting up of 
the franchisee’s business and ongoing support to the franchisee.” (Forward and Fulop, 1993) 
Business format franchising has become spread only relatively recently and represents a modern 
form of franchising.  
It is one of the ways to enter new geographical markets or to enlarge activities which can be 
characterized by relatively low risk and high speed of the market entrance. Franchising is one of 
the initial stages of a company’s internationalization process as it doesn’t demand complete 
involvement of a franchisor into international activities. In a franchise relationship a franchisor 
grants a franchisee with the right to use his know-how, business plan and brand in exchange for 
royalties which are usually paid as a percentage on the franchisee’s revenues. 
The concept of franchising has been investigated from the standpoint of different disciplines: 
marketing, economics, law, organizational theory. Findings from the analysis of franchising 
come from these different spheres. This interest can be explained by the complexity and diversity 
of the phenomenon of franchising (Fulop and Forward, 1997).  
It is possible to identify 3 stages in the development of franchising. The first formal use of 
franchising was made by the Singer Sewing machine Company in 1850’s. Albert Singer used 
franchising as a way to distribute his sewing machines to a wider geographic area as he didn’t 
have enough capital to pay the salaries of salesmen. The main contribution Singer made to 
franchising is the creation of the first franchise contract which has become the basis for modern 
franchise contracts. (Younger B., “The history of franchising”) The second stage of franchising 
development took place in 1920-1930’s when franchising was employed by the petrol companies 
who strived to expand their operations (Fulop and Forward, 1997). The third stage of franchising 
development is the modern business format franchising. It has begun in the USA in the post 
World War II period (1940’s-1950’s). The most prominent examples of companies that have 
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successfully developed their operations on the basis of franchising are Kentucky Fried Chicken 
(1930), Burger King (1954), McDonalds (1955), service companies such as Holiday Inn, Hertz 
and many others. Fast development of franchising led to the creation of International Franchise 
Association (IFA) in the USA whose aim is to regulate the franchising industry. 
 
2.2. Advantages of Franchising 
Franchising offers a lot of advantages in comparison with other forms of company development. 
First of all, franchising allows to avoid the risk of investing in company-owned facilities. 
Consequently, it’s easier to exit the market if activities there turn out to be unprofitable. 
Franchisee carries the whole responsibility and risk for the franchise operations. Secondly, 
franchising allows a franchisor to benefit from the local knowledge of a franchisee which might 
be difficult and costly to acquire. The third advantage of franchising is that it allows to save time 
and scarce financial resources in entering new markets. This can also give an advantage if a 
company needs to enter a certain market rapidly.  
Franchising represents a relatively easy way for small companies to expand because it doesn’t 
require as much investment as the opening of a wholly-owned outlet does. Franchising not only 
allows to save scarce financial resources but also to reduce the managerial efforts involved in the 
operations. At the same time, franchising agreement guarantees the ability of a franchisor to 
control franchisees and hence to insure the consistency of quality standards and brand name 
across the network. Franchising also offers lower capital risk for franchisors because franchisees 
have to invest their own capital into the opening of an outlet. This insures that franchisees are 
highly motivated to work for the success of the outlet as they invest their own money in this 
venture. In this way franchising allows even large companies to partially acquire the strengths of 
small firms. (Fulop and Forward, 1997) The agency theory also suggests that franchising can be 
used as a mechanism for reducing the agency costs if the company-owned subsidiaries are 
geographically dispersed or high costs are incurred from controlling them. (Fulop and Forward, 
1997) 
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2.3. Disadvantages of Franchising 
Simultaneously with advantages franchising has some disadvantages that should be considered 
when choosing this form of operations. First of all the results of franchising almost completely 
depend on the franchisee’s ability to obtain revenues and hence to pay royalties. Royalties are 
usually lower than the profits that a company might get when carrying out the operations itself.  
Another risk is the risk to create potential competitor who will be able to employ the obtained 
knowledge also after the termination of the franchise contract. However, the largest risk of 
franchising is the opportunistic behavior of a franchisee. This raises the problem of assuring 
appropriate product quality and the quality of operational activities such as marketing. Improper 
behavior on the part of a franchisee may ruin the image of the brand as a whole. In general, 
agency costs, caused by the difficulty to control company-owned operations, are reduced by the 
use of franchising. However, in the operations with a high proportion of non-repeat purchases 
there is a high risk of opportunistic behavior on the part of a franchisee who will seek to increase 
revenues by decreasing the quality of the products. This will have destructive influence on all the 
outlets of the network (Fulop and Forward, 1997). To cope with this risk franchisors may use 
different ways of control of franchisees’ behavior. 
 
3. Franchising in different theories 
 
3.1. Franchising from the perspective of Agency theory 
Agency theory is based on the principal-agent relationship, in which one party (the principal) 
delegates work to another (the agent), who performs the work on a day-to-day basis (Doherty 
and Quinn, 1999). Agency theory highlights three major problems in the principal-agent 
relationship: the importance of the information transfer process, the conflict of goals of 
franchisor and franchisee and associated monitoring costs. The background for the principal-
agent problem is the separation of ownership rights from the decision rights (actual control over 
resources). In the case of franchising the most important resource that is transferred from 
franchisor to franchisee is the brand name, business concept and reputation of franchisor. There 
are two possibilities to ensure successful cooperation between franchisor and franchisee: direct 
monitoring of franchisee’s behavior and incentives tied to franchisee’s outputs (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Outcome-based arrangements find their reflection in the positivist agency theory. They 
are believed to be effective in reducing agent opportunism because “such contracts co-align the 
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preferences of agents with those of the principal…and, therefore, the conflicts of self-interest 
between principal and agent are reduced” (Eisenhardt, 1989). Behavior-based arrangements 
require principal’s investments into information systems to be able to monitor the behavior of an 
agent. However, there is always a balance between the costs of monitoring behavior and the 
costs of measuring the outcome. The advantage of franchising for the franchisor is that 
franchisees have to invest their own capital and are interested in the improved performance of 
their outlets. (Bradach, 1997) In this way, the need to monitor the behavior of franchisees is 
reduced. 
For a relationship to be successful it is necessary to ensure that adequate information transfer 
between partners is guaranteed.  In the principal-agent relationship this is often connected with 
the difficulty and the costs for the principal to monitor the actual behavior of an agent. Under the 
conditions of information asymmetry it becomes important to balance out the benefits obtained 
from control on the part of the principal with high monitoring costs. At this point incentives 
connected to the franchisee’s activities become more effective. Franchisees have to make some 
investments at the beginning of the franchise relationship and their profits directly depend on 
their performance. Thus, franchisees are highly motivated to increase their performance and this 
leads to the decrease in the monitoring costs on the part of a franchisor (Castrogiovanni et al., 
2006). 
The adoption of agency theory to the explanation of domestic franchising has been largely 
supported by scholars (Doherty and Quinn, 1999). Doherty and Quinn (1999) state that also 
international franchise activities can be compared with the principal-agent relationship, thus 
allowing agency theory to be used in the analysis of international franchise relationship. In fact, 
the geographic dispersion of outlets shows the strongest relationship with franchising 
(Castrogiovanni et al., 2006). It increases the monitoring costs of franchisor and emphasizes the 
importance of franchisees’ incentives to perform well even without being observed. Thus, 
Doherty and Quinn (1999) assert that the international retail franchisor-franchisee relationship is 
parallel to the principal-agent model and corresponds to the requirements of Eisenhardt (1989) to 
apply the agency theory successfully, that means, the two parties are interdependent and 
cooperative yet rationally may pursue different, even contradictory goals (Lassar and Kerr, 
1997). This brings forward the problems of bounded rationality, danger of opportunism and 
information asymmetry which are present both in principal-agent and franchisor-franchisee 
relationships. The problem of information asymmetry is especially evident in the franchisor-
franchisee relationships where a significant amount of intangible assets is involved. 
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Information asymmetry is to a large extent inherent to the business format franchising, where 
most of the assets to be transferred are of tacit nature and cannot be transferred easily. In this 
case, a principal (franchisor) cannot obtain all the information regarding the day-to-day activities 
of an outlet or is not able to interpret it in an adequate manner (Doherty and Quinn, 1999). 
Information asymmetry is especially strong in international franchising when there are 
differences in economic development, legal regulations and cultural practices (Doherty, 1999). 
These differences between domestic and foreign markets also lead to higher monitoring costs. 
Information asymmetry can cause the problems in the franchisor-franchisee relationship if the 
economic goals of both are not coherent, that is there is a danger of moral hazard on the part of a 
franchisee. For example, in a franchise network it is almost impossible for a franchisor to 
determine the investments into marketing made by every single franchisee. Thus, on a short term 
a franchisee is motivated to under-invest into the development of a franchise brand. Given that 
the investment levels of other franchisees in the network stay same, the franchisee can increase 
his profits by decreasing marketing expenditures. In this case, the information asymmetry (the 
difficulty to monitor franchisee’s marketing investments) leads to franchisee’s free-riding on the 
franchisor’s brand name. 
Information asymmetry and the danger of moral hazard lead to the necessity to implement the 
mechanisms to monitor the behavior of franchisees. “The perceived seriousness of a potential 
agency problem has a direct impact on the extent of the premiums and the complexity of the 
contracts” (Doherty and Quinn, 1999). In the case of international retail franchising where 
information asymmetry poses a significant problem, there are attempts to decrease the potential 
for moral hazard and opportunism through contracting, royalty payments and fees. Thus, when 
international franchising is paralleled with the agency theory, it can be expected that contracting 
(formal control) will be the main way to overcome the information asymmetry and to control the 
behavior of franchisees. 
Still from the perspective of the agency theory franchising is a preferred way to enter markets 
which are substantially different from the domestic one (Doherty and Quinn, 1999). Firstly, the 
information asymmetry when using franchising will be lower than for example entering a new 
market through acquisition due to the local knowledge of a franchisee. Secondly, the use of 
royalty payments and fees are supposed to decrease the danger of moral hazard and help to align 
the economic goals of franchisor and franchisee. However, Lal argues that royalties play almost 
no role in the coordination of a franchise network (Lal, 1990). 
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Agency theory suggests that the main source of control is through the franchise contract and its 
strict enforcement to ensure that franchisees properly use the intangible assets, provided by the 
franchisor (Doherty and Quinn, 2000). Thus, agency theory advocates the use of coercive means 
of control. 
Another theory often used together with the agency theory to explain the use of franchising by 
firms is resource scarcity theory. Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) were the first to find out that 
companies, besides for the agency-based effects, preferred franchising more often if they lacked 
resources. 
 
3.2. Franchising from the Perspective of Resource Scarcity Theory 
Resource Scarcity Theory is one of the frameworks that are most commonly used to explain 
franchising (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006). It tries to explain franchising based on the economic 
motivation of organizations. Due to the shortage of resources inside organizations (such as 
capital, labor, managerial know-how, local market knowledge), franchising offers an opportunity 
for organizations to gain competitive advantage and to grow successfully (Altinay and Wang, 
2006), because these resources can be obtained through franchisees. Organizations can develop 
unique capabilities through the use of franchising. So, from the viewpoint of resource scarcity 
theory organizations employ franchising only when they lack resources that are necessary for 
them to grow, mainly capital and managerial know-how (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006). This can 
be the only way to compete against large competitors when resources that are available inside an 
organization are not enough to expand rapidly.  
 
Creation of a franchise system based on the motivations of resource scarcity theory can lead to 
the reluctance to invest resources into establishment of a lasting relationship with a franchisee. 
As described by Oxenfeld and Kelly (1969) small firms use franchising to speed up expansion 
until they can generate sufficient economies of scale (Oxenfeld and Kelly, 1969). Once this goal 
is achieved franchising no longer plays a vital role in the development of the organization. 
Franchisor tries to buy out the most profitable outlets of franchisees and ceases to develop his 
franchise network.  Since the final goal of franchisor is not to develop a strong franchise network 
but rather to develop organization itself by means of franchising, franchisor may pay too little 
attention to the need to align his own economic goals with those of franchisees and may fail to 
construct a successful system of control and information exchange. The information exchange 
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with franchisees is of particular importance if franchisor plans to repurchase the franchise outlets 
in the future because it promotes the transfer of franchisee’s know-how to franchisor and enables 
him to obtain the local market knowledge. Besides, the failure to create an efficient system of 
monitoring and control can lead to opportunistic behavior on the part of a franchisee and this can 
have drastic effects on the brand name of the franchisor. 
 
3.3. Franchising from the Perspective of Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) 
A franchising network as a whole is definitely influenced by the transaction costs which are 
incurred during the process of exchange between franchisor and franchisees. According to 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) transaction costs are the “costs of running the system” and include 
ex ante costs (preliminary coordination, e.g. negotiating a contract) as well as ex post costs (the 
costs of monitoring and enforcing agreements) (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Williamson 
(1996) suggests that transaction costs are based on two behavioral assumptions (bounded 
rationality and opportunism) and have two dimensions (asset specificity and uncertainty) 
(Williamson, 1996). These are the features that characterize franchising because the danger of 
opportunism is inherent to every franchise network and franchisor cannot easily verify the 
behavior of franchisees. Besides, transactions between the franchise partners always include 
some degree of uncertainty (both environmental and behavioral) and asset intangibility. Thus, 
coordination of a franchise network inevitably causes a high level of transaction costs. The 
amount of transaction costs incurred can be reduced by a proper distribution of decision rights, 
and trust is an important antecedent of this distribution. 
Trust cannot reduce the space for opportunism but can in some cases lower its probability by 
aligning the goals of franchisees with those of franchisor. “Opportunism is the assumption that, 
given the opportunity, decision makers may seek to serve their self-interests.” (Donaldson, 
Barney, 1990). According to Williamson (1996), opportunism includes calculated efforts to 
mislead, deceive, and otherwise confuse as well as violating rules (agreements) (Williamson, 
1996). However, in definite situations such violation of agreements on the part of franchisees 
may be caused by the imperfectness of the agreement in its turn caused by the environmental 
uncertainty and lack of knowledge of the local markets. In such case the self-interest of 
franchisees can be used for the benefit of the whole franchise network. Trust to the franchise 
partner and granting more decision rights can help improve the communication in the network 
and decrease opportunism. Besides, the allocation of enough decision rights to franchisees 
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reduces the need to review the contract constantly and helps the network better adapt itself to the 
environment. 
Opportunistic behavior of franchisees is especially critical for companies with high asset 
specificity. When high probability of opportunism is given “high levels of asset specificity 
increase the costs of safeguarding contractual agreements” (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). This 
means that for franchise networks with high brand value transaction costs will increase because 
of franchisor’s fear of franchisee’s opportunistic behavior. Trust and formal control through 
various monitoring mechanisms represent the two ways to deal with opportunism. An attempt to 
avoid the opportunistic behavior of franchisees through increased formal control will inevitably 
lead to increased transaction costs. On the other hand, the use of trust as a way to decrease the 
probability of opportunism allows to decrease the transaction costs. “In addition to vertical 
integration, firms can protect their specific assets by pursuing a variety of unilateral and bilateral 
hybrid governance mechanisms such as…the development of relational norms” (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997). 
Trust may also play an important role in decreasing the negative effects of bounded rationality 
because it fosters more intensive information exchange between franchisor and franchisees. So, 
the franchisor has more information to assess the behavior of franchisees. Well-structured 
communication between the franchise partners is of particular importance, as one of the reasons 
of existence of franchising is the opportunity to get more information about local markets and 
acquire the know-how of franchisees. In this connection transaction frequency is another 
important dimension that has influence on the transaction costs of a franchise network. 
According to Williamson (1985) high transaction frequency motivates firms to use hierarchical 
governance because the costs of its creation can be easily recompensated by the large scale of 
transactions (Williamson, 1985). So, high degree of trust and hence high degree of 
communication between franchisor and franchisee should lead to increased transaction costs.  
“The basic premise of TCA is that if adaptation, performance evaluation, and safeguarding costs 
are absent or low, economic actors will favor market governance.” (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997).  On the other hand, if these costs are too high, the firms will prefer hierarchical 
governance. As mentioned above, transaction costs in the franchise networks can be very high 
and this should lead firms to turn franchisees’ outlets into company owned ones. One of the most 
significant reasons why franchise networks exist is the need in the information from the local 
market that cannot be gathered and employed by company-owned outlets as efficiently as 
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through franchise outlets. Since local market knowledge occupies such a significant position, 
timely and open information exchange is indispensable to achieve the goals of a franchise 
network. And this can be guaranteed only if trust prevails in the franchise relationship. 
Environmental and behavioral uncertainties are other dimensions in the transaction cost analysis 
which help to explain the prevailing forms of governance in franchise networks.  
High levels of environmental uncertainty lead to increased costs of adaptation of contractual 
agreements, and thus increase the transaction costs (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). The study of 
Pilling et al. (1994) has shown that environmental uncertainty has a positive effect on the costs 
of developing an exchange relationship but has no effect on the costs of monitoring such 
relationship (Pilling et al., 1994). This may mean that a relationship between franchisor and 
franchisee is regulated through relational norms and trust, which manifests itself through a 
thorough process of partner’s choice. Once this choice is done, the monitoring activities and the 
transaction costs don’t change under the conditions of high environmental uncertainty. At the 
same time franchise network can benefit from the possibility to respond more quickly to the 
environmental changes in the local markets than it would if the outlets were vertically integrated 
into the firm. This is also supported by the findings of Klein (1989) who states that high levels of 
environmental dynamism motivate firms to exert lower levels of control (Klein, 1989). This 
allows firms to decrease transaction costs associated with adaptation problems. 
Behavioral uncertainty is viewed by the transaction cost analysis as a factor that increases the 
costs of evaluating the performance of business partners (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Firms 
will try to reduce their transaction costs through vertical integration. As this method is not 
available for franchise networks, the only way to decrease transaction costs will be to develop a 
system of relational governance that will decrease the necessity to monitor franchisees’ behavior. 
Transaction costs may take the form of direct and opportunity costs (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997). These costs are closely related to the behavioral assumptions and dimensions of 
transaction cost analysis. For example, the need to protect firm’s know-how leads it to the 
necessity to monitor the behavior of franchisees. On the other hand, failure to protect firm’s 
knowledge can lead to the financial losses. Environmental uncertainty causes the problems of 
adaptation. However, if a company is unable to adapt to the changing environment it will not be 
able to survive in a long term. Behavioral uncertainty makes it more complicated to evaluate the 
behavior of franchisees and their compliance with the agreement but without finding a way to 
cope with behavioral uncertainty a firm will be unable to prevent opportunism. 
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According to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) the original framework of transaction cost analysis 
proposes only two variants of governance: market exchange or internal organization (Rindfleisch 
and Heide, 1997). Franchising represents a hybrid form of organization which nevertheless 
allows to benefit from the features of internal governance, such as control and monitoring 
mechanisms, and to obtain local know-how and market knowledge. The need in the franchise 
partner’s know-how will be decisive for the balance of the decision rights in the relationship and 
whether this relationship will be governed more by the coercive or non-coercive methods of 
control. 
To summarize, environmental and behavioral uncertainties in the network increase the 
information asymmetry and the need in the local market knowledge of the franchisees. These 
two factors as well as the franchisor’s asset specificity have an impact on the franchisor’s 
perceived need to monitor franchisees’ activities. The higher the asset specificity (e.g. high brand 
value) the higher the need in monitoring will be because of potential opportunistic behavior from 
the side of franchisee. For the same reason information asymmetry will also have direct 
influence on the need to monitor. On the other hand, need in franchisee’s local market 
knowledge should decrease franchisor’s desire to monitor franchisee’s behavior and rely more 
on relational norms of governance. After all these factors have been analyzed, the choice 
between formal control and relational governance still depends on the level of monitoring costs. 
Low monitoring costs will make it easier for franchisor to monitor the franchisees’ behavior 
through formal methods of control, whereas high monitoring costs will make him rely more on 
relational governance to decrease transaction costs. This model is shown in the figure below: 
Figure 1: The model of choice between formal control and relational governance 
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4. The reasons to control franchisees’ behavior 
 
Power and control play an essential role in the configuration of a franchise network. The success 
of franchising to a large extent depends on the ability of a franchisor to find the right 
combination of control and autonomy in the relationship with franchisees and the methods of 
control that he will use. Franchising systems have some similarities and differences in 
comparison with completely vertically integrated and decentralized systems (Lal, 1990). As in 
vertically integrated systems franchisor has substantial control over the activities of franchisees 
which is directly expressed in a franchise contract. Nevertheless, franchisees also have a higher 
level of freedom compared with company-owned outlets and this allows to adapt the marketing 
mix of an outlet to the local market needs. The difference between an independent outlet and a 
franchisee lies first of all in the profit sharing arrangements concerning the payment of franchise 
royalties and different fees for the training and supporting activities provided by franchisor (Lal, 
1990). Besides that, as the franchise outlets have to be similar across the system, a franchisee 
must comply with the regulations concerning the design of the outlet, product offer, service 
level, marketing etc. The combination of autonomy and control in a franchisor-franchisee 
relationship depends on a large number of factors. The degree of control and autonomy in a 
franchising network may differ from one franchisee to another. (Cochet et al., 2008) These 
differences may be caused by such factors as inequality of agency costs across franchisees, the 
need in the local market knowledge, a franchisee’s power in the network and the motivation of 
franchisees.  
 
4.1. Agency costs in franchisor­franchisee relationship  
“Autonomy means the perception of own sovereignty regarding work procedures, goals and 
priorities.” (Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin, 1993) 
 
Despite all the advantages of the franchisees’ autonomy, it increases the monitoring costs and the 
agency costs. (Cochet et al., 2008) These costs may exceed the benefits from the improved 
performance connected with higher autonomy. The inequality of monitoring costs to control 
different franchisees and hence the inequality of autonomy provided to the franchisees by 
franchisor are caused by the franchisee’s location, size and cultural differences. As the 
monitoring costs may differ across franchisees, it means that different franchisees will 
experience different levels of autonomy.  
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Nevertheless, Fulop and Forward state that the agency theory views franchising as a method to 
reduce agency costs compared with the establishment of company-owned subsidiaries which 
have almost no autonomy (Fulop and Forward, 1997). In this case franchising is applicable not 
only as a way to raise capital for small franchise firms but also for large companies who want to 
gain efficiency and reduce the agency costs. Franchising in this case is more efficient than 
vertical integration. This means that given large distance and difficulty to monitor activities 
agency costs are higher for company-owned subsidiaries than for franchise outlets. Thus, with 
high agency costs franchising should be preferred over company-owned branches, and the higher 
the agency costs the more autonomy should be provided to franchisees. Besides, franchisor will 
have to rely more on relational forms of control than on formal control. This idea is shown in the 
figure below: 
Figure 2: Relationship between agency costs and levels of autonomy 
 
Low agency costs      High agency costs 
 
 
 
 
Company-owned  Franchisees   Franchisees 
outlets    with low autonomy  with high autonomy 
 
4.2. The need in the local market knowledge 
The level of control and the choice of control methods are closely connected with the need of a 
franchisor in the local market knowledge. As a rule, the more geographically distant the 
franchisee is from the franchisor the more difficulties the latter has in monitoring his activities. 
At the same time the distance from the franchisor’s local country may mean a more urgent need 
to adapt the business concept to the demands of the consumers. In these conditions more 
autonomy in the decision making should be granted to the franchisees. The preference will be 
given to less formal forms of control, first of all relational governance. Relational governance as 
a method of control insures that there is a constant flow of information between franchisor and 
franchisee. Thus, franchisor can also benefit by acquiring new information about the local 
markets from the franchisees. 
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4.3. The motivation of franchisees 
The characteristics of franchisees and their motivation to pursue franchising activity are also 
essential to the franchise relationship and the choice of control methods by a franchisor. There 
are two views on the motivation of franchisees. The first one postulates that franchisees are 
individuals with few entrepreneurial characteristics as franchising entails less risk than 
independent activity and at the same time offers some flexibility and autonomy at the unit level. 
(Dant, 1995) In other words, franchising offers an opportunity to buy a job. When choosing to 
enter a franchise network franchisees deliberately select to work in an interdependent 
environment of a big organization that decreases business risk. The other view suggests that 
franchisees use franchising as a way to start their own business, to be relatively independent 
compared to being an employee and yet to benefit from the established business concepts. 
(Peterson and Dant, 1990) In this case imposing too much formal control on the franchisees will 
lead to an increased dissatisfaction and disappointment. 
 
4.4. Franchisee’s power in the network 
In the franchise networks, franchisor rather than franchisee has the majority of power (El-Ansary 
and Stern, 1972). However, franchisees can also obtain power depending on the character of the 
franchise relationship. The power that franchisees have on franchisors and franchise network has 
often been underestimated. (Fulop and Forward, 1997) Franchisors are dependent on franchisees’ 
ability and willingness to operate in accordance with the agreement to guarantee the congruence 
in the franchise network. If essential changes are to be made to the franchise system a franchisor 
actually has to obtain the consent of the franchisees to the changes because their dissatisfaction 
will have negative influence on the network’s activity results. Franchisors have to entrust their 
brand name and the reputation of the franchise network to the franchisees whose improper 
behavior may damage the reputation of the franchisor and other franchisees in the network. 
Besides, even though franchisor has a franchise contract to impose his requirements on the 
franchisee, litigations can cause loss of profit, negative publicity and increased dissatisfaction of 
other franchisees in the network.  
And at last, the development of the franchise network (such as the increased number of multi-
unit, area, and master franchisees) leads to an increased power of franchisees in a franchise 
relationship because they possess enough financial power to enforce their decisions. Franchisors 
become more dependent on a small number of franchisees to maintain the franchise network. 
This leads to the necessity to compromise and to keep the disagreements to a minimum. The 
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level of franchisees’ power in the franchise system has a significant impact on the balance of 
control and autonomy in the relationship and also on the control methods that franchisor will rely 
on. 
 
4.5. Franchisor­driven factors for control 
There are also franchisor-driven factors that influence the choice of the control methods and the 
extent of autonomy provided to franchisees. Control of franchisees’ activities will take place on a 
larger scale if it is important for a franchisor to control his brand or, in other words, if a brand 
name is essential for the success of a network. Franchisees tend to undertake actions that will 
maximize the profits of their own outlets and not necessarily the profits of the chain. (Lafontaine 
and Shaw, 2005) They are interested in the franchisor’s brand name only as long as it brings 
profits for their outlet, whereas franchisor obtains profits from all the outlets in the franchise 
network and is thus interested in the maintenance of a brand name throughout the chain. This 
imbalance may lead to under-investment of franchisee into the franchisor’s brand name which is 
difficult to detect in a short term but which may ruin the brand name in the future. “The desire to 
exercise power and utilize the mechanisms available is determined by the franchisor’s perception 
of their brand and the value the franchisor places on the brand.” (Doherty and Alexander, 2006). 
If franchisor doesn’t have a strong strategic direction and cannot effectively differentiate his 
brand name from competitors, then it is difficult to control the activities of the franchisees. 
Under such circumstances it is likely that franchisees will obtain more autonomy in the franchise 
network and that the corporate image will be diluted. Such lack of clear franchise concept also 
makes it difficult to enforce the franchise contract, because franchisor himself is not sure of what 
he is franchising. (Doherty and Quinn, 2000) 
The level of control exercised by franchisor will also be higher if the need for standardization is 
high. The higher the required level of standardization the higher the risk of a brand damage and 
hence the higher the level of control exercised by franchisor. The control methods may evolve 
with time as a company moves from carrying out mere product franchising to business format 
franchising. In the course of its development a company becomes involved in a strategic 
planning making it put special emphasis on its brand. The desire to protect his brand makes a 
franchisor introduce different methods of control to make sure that the activities of a franchisee 
are consistent with the overall perception of a brand. This may also cause the willingness of a 
franchisor to enforce the contract (formal control). If there are several franchisees in a chain then 
it is in their best interest that a franchisor takes control of the franchise activities, because it 
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ensures consistency of a brand. This also means that a brand is of value to a franchisor and helps 
build trust. 
Other factors that influence the choice of control methods are the company size and the stage of 
franchise system development. It can be suggested that as a company gets larger higher 
complexity of franchise operations will cause more use of formal control because it is too 
difficult to control a large number of franchisees through supporting activities. As a franchise 
network gets larger problems can occur if the head office of franchisor remains small in size as 
compared to the number of franchisees, because in this case franchisor cannot provide adequate 
supporting activities and this will arouse increasing dissatisfaction of franchisees.  
5. Methods of control 
 
The methods that a franchisor may use to control his franchise network are franchise contract 
(formal control), the supporting activities, franchise partner selection, establishing a good 
relationship with the franchisees, usage of master or area development franchising (relational 
governance). (Doherty and Quinn, 2000) The last four methods allow to create conditions under 
which formal methods of control will be unnecessary as it is obvious that formal methods are not 
appropriate for the day-to-day control of franchise activities. 
Relational governance is believed to be more preferable in a franchise network, because it is 
likely to increase franchisees’ motivation, which will lead to an easier control by franchisor, a 
better exchange of knowledge between franchisor and franchisee, better cooperation and lower 
numbers of litigations. (Hunt and Nevin, 1974) 
 
5.1. Franchise contract  
Initially, the power distribution in a franchisor-franchisee relationship is to a great extent 
predetermined by a franchise contract. Franchise contract is a major source of power, control and 
conflict in the franchising relationships. Its goal is to control for the potential of moral hazard 
arising as a result of information asymmetry. (Doherty and Quinn, 2000) The peculiarity of 
franchising is that the franchisor and franchisee remain legally separated even though they rely 
on each other to succeed and develop the franchise network. For this reason a franchise contract 
plays an essential role in the determination of rights and obligations of the parties and is 
expected to help to avoid conflicts. Because of the legal independence of a franchisee a contract 
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must state all the obligations of the parties and provide an effective means of control for a 
franchisor. Thus, a franchise contract defines the formal relationship between the franchisor and 
the franchisees. 
 
5.2. The Supporting Activities  
Supporting activities are another way to gain control over franchisees. But in contrast to the 
franchise contract, supporting activities rely on the establishment of positive attitudes towards 
franchisor, as it is believed that the more satisfied franchisees are, the more willingly they will 
accept the attempts of franchisor to impose control on their activities. However, evidently it’s 
more expensive and complicated to carry out supporting activities in the international setting 
because differences between countries have to be taken into account. The major reasons for the 
difficulty to provide supporting activities to international franchisees are "non transferable 
experience, distance and communication difficulties" (Kaufmann and Leibenstein, 1988). 
 
5.3. Franchise partner selection 
Franchise partner selection represents one of the methods of relational governance and is one of 
the most crucial aspects of a franchise relationship because failure to select a right partner may 
not only lead to the failure of the relationship but also to negative financial and strategic 
consequences (Altinay and Wang, 2006). At this stage franchisor decides whether it is possible 
to build a meaningful relationship with a potential partner based rather on trust than on a legal 
agreement and whether a potential franchisee will follow his business concept. Since the 
franchisee’s ability to adapt the franchisor’s brand concept is very important for the development 
of a franchise network, the culture and prior knowledge between franchisor and franchisee have 
to fit (Altinay and Wang, 2006). According to Altinay and Wang (2006) prior knowledge 
involves the accumulated knowledge and experience of a franchisor used to educate franchisee 
and to ensure that the strategic goals of the partners coincide. Cultural distance indicates how 
hard it will be for franchisor and franchisee to understand each other’s way of doing business 
and establish a good relationship. The larger the cultural distance the more difficult it will be for 
the franchise partners to come to an agreement and the higher the failure risk will be. Altinay and 
Wang point out that prior knowledge, which is an important strategic issue for the establishment 
of a partner relationship, may become a barrier for franchisor to adapt new local knowledge and 
to change its business concept where necessary. This rigidity will impede the establishment of a 
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successful business relationship and may give rise to opportunism, where franchisees believe that 
their local know-how will not be appreciated by franchisor. 
 
5.4 Establishment of a good relationship with franchisees 
Establishment of a good relationship with franchisees is another way to control their behavior. It 
is meaningful under condition that both parties expect to obtain more profit than they would 
without establishing a relationship. This form of relational governance allows to reduce the 
informational asymmetries inherent to the franchisor-franchisee relationship.  
Communication is the essential part of the franchise relationship. Trust between franchisor and 
franchisee is crucial for the establishment of such communication. And as communication is the 
basis for relational governance trust lies in the centre of it. Trust can be developed only if both 
parties see their venture as a long term relationship and invest time and money into it. To make a 
franchise relationship successful not only the franchisor has to trust the franchisee but also the 
other way round. If a franchisee trusts a franchisor he is more willing to follow his 
recommendations and to stick to the franchise contract. It should be noted that relational form of 
control may only be effective if there is compatibility in the economic goals of a franchisor and a 
franchisee.  
Successful establishment of a good relationship with franchisee begins first of all with the right 
choice of the franchise partner and requires efforts to build up trust. In a short run the conditions 
of the contract can be imposed on the franchisee but this already means that something has gone 
wrong and may be the reason for the failure of other franchise operations. 
 
5.5. Control through the use of master or area development franchising 
Area development and master franchising also belong to methods of relational governance as 
they foresee the delegation of authority over a large area of activities to one franchisee. Their 
main idea is to optimize the franchise relationships by entrusting one partner with the 
development of a franchise chain in a particular country or region. Operating a franchise chain 
consisting of several franchisees in one region may require too many resources from the 
franchisor to guarantee appropriate control of the activities. On the other hand, dealing only with 
one franchisee requires a lot of trust in the relationship because the larger the franchisee the more 
power he has. At the same time such empowerment has a positive influence on the motivation of 
a franchisee. 
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Area development franchising requires that a franchisee opens several outlets in a region during 
a definite period of time but doesn’t allow sub-franchising. In the study of Cochet et al. (2008) 
on the relationship between the extent of autonomy and relational governance it is stated that 
high levels of intra-chain competition increase the danger of opportunistic behavior (Cochet et 
al., 2008). Several competing stores of the same franchise chain in the same geographical area 
reduce the market size of each single franchisee and decrease the profits that can be obtained. 
This may motivate the franchisees to increase the short term profits by compromising the quality 
of the product. This statement was supported by the results of the study. It has also been found 
out that the positive relationship between autonomy and relational governance intensity is 
stronger among franchisees with high levels of intra-chain competition. Area development 
franchise agreement allows to avoid the risk of opportunism and the costs of investing more into 
relational forms of control because a franchisee has exclusive rights for opening outlets in a 
certain region and is in this way protected from the intra-chain competition. 
The master franchising allows a franchisee to sub-franchise the business concept of the 
franchisor in a particular region and he is then in charge of this franchise chain in a region. “In 
master franchise agreements the rights and responsibilities of the master franchisee are extended 
to include training, coordination of local franchisees, monitoring performance and the 
implementation of franchisor strategies.“ (Brookes, Roper, 2008) Such arrangement overcomes 
the information asymmetry problems which can arise when there are significant cultural and 
language barriers, differences in legislation and operating practices between franchisor and 
potential franchisees.  
 In master franchising arrangement the local partner becomes a major source of information and 
monitors the activities of the sub-chain. In such arrangements a master franchisee is highly 
interested in the development of the franchise network as he invests substantial resources into it. 
This helps to keep the problem of the moral hazard to minimum. Besides, due to the local 
knowledge the monitoring costs of a master franchisee will be much lower than if franchisor has 
to monitor the activities of each franchisee in the network. The adoption of master franchising 
not only allows to control the franchise network efficiently but also to guarantee its successful 
development in the future because its spread will not be connected with huge monitoring costs 
for a franchisor. 
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5.6. Relational governance as the antecedent of franchisee’s entrepreneurial 
behavior  
The use of relational methods of control such as franchisor’s supporting activities and trust leads 
to more entrepreneurial behavior of the franchisees. Franchising relationship itself constrains the 
entrepreneurial ability of the franchisees because they have to follow the provisions of the 
franchise contract. Thus a franchisor would not be able to benefit from the local know-how of a 
franchisee. The preference for relational governance allows to build up a strong communication 
link between the two parties and the introduction of innovations on behalf of a franchisee will 
lead to the improved overall performance of the chain.  
According to the previous research “entrepreneurial behavior in firms is moderated by 
organizational characteristics such as the openness of communication channels, control 
mechanisms and levels of support within the organizations” (Weaven, 2004). Franchisees are 
more susceptible to the changes in their environment and are more flexible due to their small 
size. Closer relationship with franchisor facilitates communication and the implementation of 
innovations across the network. Closer communication of franchisees with franchisors in its turn 
reduces the information asymmetry and thus reduces monitoring and agency costs.  
 
It can be concluded from the research (Hadfield, 1991) that franchisors prefer a combination of 
formal control and relational governance because too much formal control may impede the 
desire of franchisees for innovation and entrepreneurship.  
 
6. Formal control vs. relational governance  
 
It is generally recognized that the employment of relational forms of governance bring a lot of 
advantages, such as the possibility to decrease monitoring costs, higher flexibility, more 
information exchange, etc. From the point of view of the franchisee, the use of the contract by 
franchisor can make franchisee less loyal and less cooperative. In the situation of information 
asymmetry this can lead franchisee to share less information with franchisor and will decrease 
the benefits that franchisor can achieve from this relationship. However, more extensive use of 
relational governance also means higher degree of franchisor’s vulnerability to opportunism. 
“The challenge is to construct governance structures that safeguard the exchange while 
simultaneously maximizing benefits for the participants” (Cannon et al., 2000).   
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Relational norms and legal contract can be viewed as complementary: each franchisor-franchisee 
relationship can be characterized by a certain combination of these two governance mechanisms 
with one or the other prevailing. It has been pointed out that the choice between the different 
methods of control is influenced by the levels of external as well as internal uncertainty (Cannon 
et al., 2000). 
 The relationship between the parties’ interdependence, uncertainty and the use of a formal 
contract and relational norms can be investigated from the perspective of marketing channels 
literature, which recognizes that franchisor can use both coercive and non-coercive power to 
control franchise network.  
The use of different methods of control is influenced by such characteristics of a relationship as 
interdependence and uncertainty. “Uncertainty, when combined with some form of dependence, 
is a major factor affecting the organization and governance of exchange” (Cannon et al., 2000). 
The study of Cannon et al. (2000) on the plural forms of governance has concentrated first of all 
on the supply markets, yet can be adopted to the franchisor-franchisee relationship which is also 
characterized by high levels of both internal and external uncertainty as well as high levels of 
dependence. External uncertainty exists in the franchisor-franchisee relationship through the 
variations in the product demand, market dynamism, competition in the market etc. Internal 
uncertainty is manifested through the difficulty to measure performance of a single franchisee 
and the difficulty to determine actual behavior of franchisees in the network. The members of 
franchise networks are also highly interdependent. Franchisor entrusts his brand name and his 
business concept to the franchisees whose opportunistic behavior can cause great damages. 
Franchisees depend on the franchisor to prolong the franchise contract and to provide enough 
supporting activities as well as to coordinate the franchise network properly. Given all these 
factors it can be stated that the combination of formal control and relational governance in a 
franchisor-franchisee relationship is moderated by the levels of uncertainty and dependence.  
Legal contract alone is not considered to be an effective way to coordinate relations in the 
network (Williamson, 1985). There is always some level of environmental uncertainty and it is 
impossible to foresee all the contingencies in the contract. For this reason the so called 
neoclassic contract doctrine has been developed to make the contracts more flexible and “open” 
to unforeseen future changes (Cannon et al., 2000). According to this doctrine contracts may 
include such provisions as “good faith”, “reasonable commercial standards” and other general 
provisions to ensure the adaptability of a contract to the future developments. However, it is 
argued that even such contractual provisions are limited in flexibility and the contracts including 
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them cannot guarantee appropriate relational control (Williamson, 1985). Based on this Cannon 
et al. (2000) state that when a relationship is characterized by high levels of uncertainty and 
interdependence between partners, detailed contracts alone cannot be effective means of 
governance and will not lead to improved performance. Nevertheless, it is unreasonable to deny 
the role of a legal contract at all because it clarifies from the beginning the roles of the parties, 
their assumptions and expectations. 
Relational norms can be defined as “shared expectations regarding behavior and reflect 
expectations about attitudes and behaviors parties have in working cooperatively together to 
achieve mutual and individual goals” (Cannon et al., 2000). Cannon et al. (2000) reduce the 
number of relational norms suggested by Macneil (1980) to the five major ones: 
- flexibility – implies that the parties view an agreement as open to changes as the 
environmental conditions change; 
- solidarity – the belief that success will come from cooperation with each other rather 
than competition against each other and dictates that parties have to support each other in 
the situations when difficulties arise; 
- mutuality – means that the parties have to strive for joint gains and that one cannot 
benefit at the expense of the other. This norm is crucial to prevent opportunistic behavior 
in a franchise network; 
- harmonization of conflict – shows the willingness of partners to cooperate in finding a 
solution in conflicts acceptable to all parties; 
- restraint in the use of power – means the reluctance to exploit the advantages of one’s 
bargaining position to achieve gains. The logic and the necessity of this norm in a 
relationship have been explained in the study of Frazier and Summers (1986). It has been 
found out that exploitation of power in a relationship can lead to retaliation and will have 
negative impact on the satisfaction of partners in the network and the continuity of the 
relationship itself thus opening way to opportunistic behavior. 
These relational norms represent a strong control mechanism and help to avert opportunistic 
behavior where a legal contract is incomplete and where high uncertainty is given. The reliance 
on such norms provides high flexibility of a system which is especially important in an uncertain 
environment. However, due to their ambiguity relational norms will not necessarily lead to 
improved performance of the system and need to be backed up by a legal contract to determine 
clearly the tasks and the expectations of franchisor and franchisee. Also, though a legal contract 
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is not appropriate for a day-to-day control of the system it may serve as the last way to enforce 
the conditions which are of particular importance to a franchisor. 
The findings of the study by Cannon et al. (2000) have shown that detailed contracts will not 
increase performance in conditions of the high levels of uncertainty however can be an effective 
way of governance in a stable environment. It has been also found out that relational norms 
enhance the performance in a relationship irrespectively of the levels of uncertainty because they 
emphasize the shared values and the solidarity of the parties. According to the study the right 
combination of a legal contract and relational norms is important to guarantee the enhancement 
of performance. When the uncertainty is high, performance will decrease if it is coordinated only 
with the help of a detailed contract without the support of relational norms. On the other hand, if 
relational norms are well-developed in a network, then a contract will improve the performance. 
In the conditions of low uncertainty, the main contingencies can be specified in the contract and 
thus relational norms become unnecessary and don’t influence the performance of a franchisee. 
7. The impact of power on the choice of the methods of control 
 
As mentioned above, the source of power and restraint in its use have a significant impact on the 
way control is exercised in a franchise network and on the levels of franchisees’ satisfaction with 
the franchise relationship. Franchisees’ satisfaction in its turn determines whether relational 
norms will be sufficient to control the behavior of franchisees. 
“Power, in its most general sense, refers to the ability of one individual or group to control or 
influence the behavior of another” (Hunt and Nevin, 1974). The franchise literature suggests that 
there is a dichotomy in the sources of power that franchisors have, that is coercive and non-
coercive sources of power. “The franchisor, being the strong channel member, has coercive and 
noncoercive sources of power that can be exercised to control the franchisee” (Hunt and Nevin, 
1974). Non-coercive power implies the use of trust and persuasion as a means to coordinate the 
activities of franchisees rather than threat (Doherty and Quinn, 2000).  Depending on the sources 
of power available to a franchisor the methods of control that he uses will differ. French and 
Raven have defined five major sources of power: coercive, reward, legitimate, referent and 
expert power (French and Raven, 1959): 
- Coercive power (ij) – power based on the expectations of j concerning the possible 
punishment by i if j fails to correspond to the demands of i; 
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- Reward power (ij) – power based on the belief by j that i has the ability to mediate 
rewards for him; 
- Legitimate power (ij) – power based on the belief of j that i has a legitimate right to 
influence j; 
- Referent power (ij) – power based on the identification of j with i or a desire for such 
identification; 
- Expert power (ij) – power based on a level of knowledge that j attributes to i in a 
certain area. 
Reward, legitimate, referent and expert power belong to non-coercive sources of power.  
There is no unanimous opinion on whether high levels of power possessed by a franchisor will 
cause him to use more or less formal methods of control (Frazier and Summers, 1986). Some 
researchers suggest that franchisor’s high levels of power will lead to exploitation of franchisees 
and the use of predominantly formal strategies of control (Robicheaux and El-Ansary, 1975). 
Others assert that high levels of power will insure effective coordination of the system and better 
exchange of information (Reve, Stern, 1979). Though laboratory studies have shown positive 
correlation between higher power and formal control (Smith and Leginski, 1970) it is probable 
that their results cannot be generalized onto the real-world intra-channel relationships (Frazier 
and Summers, 1986). In the long-term relations franchisor with high levels of power is unlikely 
to exploit it through increased formal control because this may have negative effect on the 
relationship with franchisees and because franchisor is interested in the successful development 
of the system. The research by Hunt and Nevin (1974) has identified that “franchisors were 
found to rely primarily on coercive sources of power to achieve control over the franchisees” 
(Hunt and Nevin, 1974). Later research by Etgar (1976) addressing the power in conventional 
distributive channels contradicted Hunt and Nevin's (1974) findings, noting that non-coercive 
power sources (provision of training, supportive advertising etc.) are more helpful in achieving 
control over the agents than reliance on their dependence (coercive power). Non-coercive power 
sources imply a voluntary exchange process between principal and agents and render agents 
more willing to yield some of their independence in return for the services received from the 
principal (Etgar, 1976). Interestingly, even though Hunt and Nevin (1974) have come to the 
conclusion that franchisors tended to use formal methods of control, their research has found out 
that higher reliance on relational governance will lead to higher levels of franchisees’ 
satisfaction. Such factors as higher quality assistance in the areas of equipment, site location, 
training, product deletions and additions were stated to significantly improve the franchisees’ 
satisfaction with the franchise relationship (Hunt and Nevin, 1974). 
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The study of Frazier and Summers (1986) on the correlation of franchisor’s power with its use in 
the franchise channel of car dealerships has shown that the manufacturer’s power is related 
inversely to the manufacturer’s use of formal methods of control (Frazier and Summers, 1986). 
This can be due to the interconnectedness between franchisor and franchisee. A suggestion has 
been pointed out that franchisors with high levels of power will use formal methods of influence 
only after other methods have been employed without success. This suggestion was supported by 
the findings of the empirical study (Frazier and Summers, 1986). One of the reasons why it is 
believed that high levels of power are negatively related with formal control is franchisor’s fear 
of retaliation on the part of franchisees (Frazier and Summers, 1986). This hypothesis has also 
found support in the empirical study. A positive relationship has been found between the 
coercive strategies of influence by franchisor and the dealer’s use of these strategies. The results 
of the study have shown that franchisees are less satisfied with the relationship if franchisor uses 
formal methods of control and are more likely to consider dissolving this relationship thus 
bringing losses to the franchisor and weakening the network. 
Thus, it can be assumed that high franchisor’s power has a positive influence on the coordination 
of the network and is positively related to the use of non-coercive influence strategies given that 
higher levels of franchisees’ satisfaction will facilitate control over them. 
 
8. Formulation of Research Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis #1: Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) have stated that transaction costs consist of ex ante 
costs (preliminary coordination of relationship) and ex post costs (the costs of monitoring and 
enforcing agreements) (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Once franchising is chosen as a way of 
company’s expansion franchisor has to deal with some degree of transaction costs, and first of all 
the costs of monitoring franchisee’s behavior. Franchisors have to choose the level of control to 
monitor franchisee’s performance and to avoid opportunistic behavior. An attempt to control 
franchisees through increased formal control will inevitably cause an increase in transaction 
costs. On the other hand, relational forms of control allow to decrease the probability of 
opportunism at the same time keeping transaction and monitoring costs low. It can be assumed 
that the higher the monitoring costs the higher will be the desire of franchisors to reduce them, 
and thus: 
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H.1: The higher the monitoring costs, the less formal control will be used in relationship with 
franchisees.  
 
Hypothesis #2: One of the most important advantages of franchising in comparison with 
company-owned outlets is the flexibility of franchisees in response to quickly changing 
environment. However, high levels of formal control and the need to strictly adhere to the legal 
contract can lead to adaptation problems within a franchise system. Franchisor and franchisee 
must constantly negotiate the adaptation of the contract to the environmental changes. These 
environmental changes will lead to the increase in the transaction costs if franchisor-franchisee 
relationship is guided by more formal control (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Reliance on 
relational forms of governance will permit the system to benefit from increased flexibility and 
higher responsiveness to environmental uncertainty. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H.2: When there is high degree of environmental uncertainty less formal control will be 
preferred. 
 
Hypothesis #3: Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) postulate that high transaction costs will lead firms 
to adapt hierarchical governance in their relations with business partners. High transaction costs 
are caused by such factors as high environmental and behavioral uncertainty and danger of 
opportunistic behavior. These features are quite dominant in franchise networks and would 
motivate companies to reject franchising as a possible form of expansion.  However, according 
to the resource scarcity theory the main motivation of firms to use franchising is the lack of 
financial resources, labor and local market knowledge inside the organization. If the need in the 
local market knowledge from the part of franchisor is high, this implies high information 
asymmetry and increase in the transaction costs. Franchisor is more likely to use less formal 
control and relational forms of governance to decrease the transaction costs. This leads to the 
third hypothesis: 
H.3: The higher the need of franchisor in the local market knowledge of franchisee, the less 
formal control will be used. 
 
Hypothesis #4: The agency theory views contracting, royalty payments and fees as an effective 
way to reduce opportunism and potential for moral hazard. Furthermore, for franchisors it’s of 
advantage that franchisees have to invest their own capital into the outlets because they are more 
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motivated to increase performance of their outlets than outlet managers would be. This reduces 
the need to monitor the behavior of franchisees (Bradach, 1997) and in view of lower probability 
of opportunism less formal control can be applied to coordinate the franchise network. Thus the 
4th hypothesis is: 
 
H.4: The higher the investments of franchisees, the less franchisor will tend to use formal 
control to monitor their behavior. 
 
Hypothesis #5: The separation of ownership rights on the intangible assets (such as a brand 
name) from the decision rights in a franchise relationship leads to the principal-agent problem. 
The goals of franchisor and franchisees are not completely congruent, because franchisees are 
interested only in the profits they can obtain from their outlets whereas franchisor obtains profits 
from the performance of the whole chain. The imbalance leads to the short-term strategic 
orientation of franchisees and reduces their desire to undertake investments into franchisor’s 
brand name.  This opportunistic behavior is invisible and difficult to detect in a short term but 
can destroy the brand name in the future. The perceived seriousness of this agency problem 
between franchisor and franchisee has a direct impact on the levels of the fees and the 
complexity of the franchise contracts as a way to control the behavior of franchisees (Doherty 
and Quinn, 1999). Thus, it may be assumed that: 
 
H.5: The higher the importance of a brand to franchisor, the more formal control will be used.  
 
Hypothesis #6: The business format franchising can be characterized by a high degree of 
information asymmetry because most of the assets that franchisor transfers to franchisee are 
intangible and can be neither easily transferred nor easily controlled by franchisor. Franchisor 
can’t collect all the information concerning the everyday activities of a franchisee and even when 
he can he can’t interpret it correctly (Doherty and Quinn, 1999). The intangibility of the assets 
will lead to high behavioral uncertainty and will make franchisor’s attempts to monitor the 
behavior of franchisees very expensive (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Firms will normally try to 
reduce their transaction costs and the only way to achieve it and to avoid high monitoring costs 
will be to employ less formal control and to develop a system of relational governance. From this 
the 6th hypothesis follows: 
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H.6: The more intangible the knowledge and know-how of the franchisor the less formal 
control will be used. 
 
9.  Empirical Research 
 
9.1. Methodology 
To test the hypotheses of this study the data have been collected from a sample of franchisors 
operating in Germany. The study was designed as a mail survey and was carried out from April 
to September 2010. A self-administered questionnaire was sent to a sample of 700 franchisors. 
Each mail contained a 6-page long questionnaire, a cover letter explaining the purposes of the 
study and guaranteed anonymity to the participants. The questionnaires were returned by mail or 
could be filled out in Internet. After reminders the response rate of 20% has been achieved. The 
final sample consisted of 137 questionnaires. 
 
9.2. The Check of Normally Distributed Data 
 
The testing of the hypotheses above is based on the analyses which assume normally distributed 
data. Since the data include a lot of variables, only those variables will be checked for being 
normally distributed which are used in the analyses of the above mentioned hypotheses. For the 
reasons of conciseness mean scores will be used for the variables. These are: 
 
1)  The franchisee’s decision rights in different spheres of activities (mean value); 
2) The monitoring costs (the mean value of: the difficulty of controlling the behavior of an outlet 
manager, the difficulty to assess his competencies/capabilities, the difficulty to measure his 
performance); 
3) High environmental uncertainty (the mean value of: fluctuation of sales at the outlet level, the 
difficulty to predict the market development at the outlet level, the speed of the change of the 
economic environment in the local market); 
4) The advantage of higher local market knowledge (Franchising vs. Company-owned outlets); 
5) The investment level of franchisees (the mean value of all franchisee’s expenses at the 
beginning of a franchise relationship); 
6) The importance of a brand (the mean value of: the strength of a brand name compared to 
competitors, brand recognition of a franchise system compared to competitors, franchise 
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system’s good reputation for quality and the importance of a brand name for achieving 
competitive advantage); 
7) The intangibility of franchisor’s know-how (the mean value of asset intangibility in different 
spheres of activities). 
 
The values for the franchisees’ decision rights have been recoded to reflect the level of formal 
control used on the part of franchisors. 
 
The check for the assumption of the data normal distribution has produced the following results: 
Table 1: Data distribution 
 
 
These results suggest that in general the data are not normally distributed, but as the sample is 
rather large the deviations are relatively small and acceptable, except for “the importance of a 
brand name in achieving competitive advantage”. For this variable the data are strongly 
negatively skewed and are very pointy. 
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Figure 3: The importance of brand name for achieving competitive advantage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.3. Descriptive Analysis 
Out of the sample of 137 franchisors 4 franchisors carried out Product Franchising, 42 were 
active in Sales/Distribution Franchising and a majority of 81 franchisors were engaged in Service 
Franchising. 10 franchisors haven’t provided response concerning their type of franchising. The 
average duration of a franchise contract is 6.8 years with the most spread contract duration of 5 
and 10 years. 
Figure 4: Distribution of Franchisees in Sample   Figure 5: The duration of franchise contract 
across Industry Sectors 
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Table 2: The duration of franchise contract 
 
 
 
 
 
The average number of franchises in Germany in 2009 makes up 95 franchisees. At the same 
time the number of franchised outlets in Germany in the same year averages 123 which means 
that some franchisees are eager to open more than 1 outlet. 
Table 3: Number of franchise systems in Germany (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Number of franchised outlets in Germany (2009) 
  
 
 
 
 
9.4 Dependent Variable 
 
The use of formal control by franchisor was operationalized by calculating the mean of items 
related to the level of franchisor’s decision rights in different spheres of activities: 
implementation of investment activities, financing the investment projects, selection of suppliers, 
product / service offering in the local market, sale price, use of advertising and sales promotion, 
equipment, procurement of inputs, introduction of new products in the local market, use of 
accounting system at the outlet level. Hiring and training of the employees have been excluded 
from the scale as they reduced the score of the Cronbach’s Alpha. Overall the result for the 
Cronbach’s Alpha was 0,88, which is above the acceptability level. 
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9.5. Independent Variables 
 
The monitoring costs. The level of the monitoring costs was measured by three separate items in 
the questionnaire. The franchisors were asked to assess how difficult it was to control the 
behavior of an outlet manager, to measure his performance and to assess his competencies and 
capabilities. The scale was then constructed averaging the scores with equal weights for these 
three items. Cronbach’s Alpha score is 0.76, inter-item correlations also supported the reliability 
of the scale. 
 
Degree of environmental uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty was operationalized by the use 
of three questionnaire items: the degrees of fluctuation of sales at the outlet level, the difficulty 
to predict the market development at the outlet level and the speed of the change of the economic 
environment in the local market. The exactness of sales forecasts concerning the development of 
local outlets had to be deleted from the scale as it reduced the Cronbach’s Alpha score 
significantly. The left three items have been aggregated with equal weights into one scale. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha score is equal to 0.74 which is an acceptable level of reliability. 
 
Local market knowledge of franchisee. To estimate the need of franchisor in the franchisee’s 
local market knowledge, franchisors were asked to assess to which extent franchising provided 
greater market knowledge advantage compared with company-owned outlets. 
 
The investments of franchisees. The investments that franchisees have to make were measured 
by averaging expenses they incur at the beginning of a franchise relationship with regards to 
training, technical and organizational support by franchisor and equipment at the outlet level. 
The Cronbach’s Alpha score is reduced by the item measuring expenses incurred for the 
equipment. However, Cronbach’s Alpha score is not significantly below the acceptance level 
(0.63), so this item was kept in the scale. 
 
The importance of a brand name to franchisor. This variable was operationalized by combining 
four items from the questionnaire: the strength of a brand name compared to competitors, brand 
recognition of a franchise system compared to competitors, franchise system’s good reputation 
for quality and the importance of a brand name for achieving competitive advantage. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha produced the score of 0.82. Inter-item and item-to-total correlations also 
suggested reliability of the scale. 
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The intangibility of franchisor’s knowledge. To measure the intangibility of franchisor’s 
knowledge 8 items which assessed the difficulty to transfer franchisor’s know-how to franchisee 
were used. These items included the difficulty to transfer a brand name, marketing, 
organizational, administrative, quality management, accounting, human resources and IT know-
how. Cronbach’s Alpha was rather high (0.91) which means high reliability of the scale. 
 
9.6. Control Variable 
To check to which extent the choice of the level of franchisor’s formal control depends on the 
internal characteristics of a franchise system it has been decided to use the size of a franchise 
system (the sum of company-owned and franchised outlets of the system) as a control variable 
for the model. 
 
9.7. Research Findings 
 
9.7.1. Correlation Analysis between Variables 
 
The correlation analysis of all the variables in the model has shown that a negative significant 
correlation exists between the level of exercised formal control and the monitoring costs. 
Besides, the use of formal control by franchisor was also negatively and significantly correlated 
with the intangibility of franchisor’s know-how. The correlations of other independent variables 
with the use of formal control turned out to be insignificant. 
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Table 5: Overall Correlation Analysis 
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9.7.2 Overall Regression Model 
 
Finally, all the independent variables used in the above hypotheses have been included into the 
regression analysis to estimate the overall capacity of the model in estimation of the franchisor’s 
decision rights. These variables are: 
1) monitoring costs; 
2) environmental uncertainty; 
3) advantage of the local market knowledge provided by franchising vs. company-owned outlets; 
4) initial investments of franchisees; 
5) the importance of  a brand for achieving competitive advantage; 
6) the intangibility of franchisor’s know-how. 
In the second case the control variable has also been added to the regression model to evaluate 
the dependence of results on the size of a franchise system. 
Having included all 6 independent variables and the use of franchisor’s control as the dependent 
variable it can be concluded that the model explains 16% of the variation in the level of 
franchisor’s decision rights. The Durbin-Watson score of 2.01 and Variance inflation factors 
show that there are no collinearity problems within the data and the assumption for regression is 
met. After the control variable “Size of a franchise system” is added to the model, the model’s 
capacity to explain the variation is increased to 18%. This implies that the level of formal control 
exercised by franchisor depends to some extent on the size of the franchise system. As the 
correlation analysis above has shown, the larger the size of the system the less is the use of the 
formal control by franchisor. 
Table 6: Overall regression analysis 
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9.8. Discussion 
 
The empirical research has shown that one of the hypotheses used in this study has been 
supported by the data (Hypotheses #1). Hypothesis #6 has found only very weak statistical 
support. Hypotheses #2, 3, 4 and 5 have not been supported by the findings. 
 
Hypothesis #1: It has been found out that indeed higher monitoring costs lead franchisors to use 
less formal control and to provide more decision rights to franchisees. This finding corresponds 
to the views of transaction costs theory which states that when transaction costs are high 
companies will search to decrease them. In the case of franchising this means that franchisor will 
rely less on direct monitoring of franchisee’s performance but rather on relational forms of 
governance and will leave more decision rights to franchisees. 
 
Hypothesis #2: The hypothesis that explained a relationship between the level of environmental 
uncertainty and the choice of the level of control has not been supported by the study.  
 
Hypothesis #3: Despite the expectations, the hypothesis that determines that higher need in local 
know-how will decrease control of franchisors has not been supported by the data. The results 
could be influenced by the sample and low international activity of the German franchise 
systems included into it. As a result, if the examined franchise systems are concentrated mainly 
in Germany, then low heterogeneity of the market is given and the need in local market 
knowledge is significantly reduced. 
 
Hypothesis #4: Though the correlation analysis has indicated a negative relationship between the 
extent of formal control and franchisees’ expenditures as was predicted by the hypothesis, but 
the results have turned out to be statistically insignificant. 
 
Hypothesis #5: The hypothesis stating that higher importance of a brand name for franchisor will 
mean more formal control and less decision rights for franchisees has not been supported by the 
research. On the contrary, it has been determined that there is a negative though statistically 
insignificant relation between the importance of a brand name and the extent of formal control. 
Further research has shown that almost all franchisors have indicated that their brand name is 
very important for achieving competitive advantage. From the one side, this could be a signal for 
the bias of franchisors towards their brand name. From the other side, a strong brand name is a 
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prerequisite for the establishment of a business format franchise system and might not be seen by 
franchisors as a reason to limit franchisees’ decision rights. 
 
Hypothesis #6: The last hypothesis that predicted direct influence of intangibility of franchisor’s 
know-how on the use of less formal control has been only weakly supported by the research 
findings. This to some extent supports the assumption of the transaction costs theory that 
franchisor will try to reduce high transaction costs connected with high intangibility of assets by 
the decrease in formal control, and will develop a system of relational governance instead. As it 
is too hard to constantly monitor the franchisees’ use of intangible assets it is easier for a 
franchisor to use less formal control and develop an efficient system of communication with 
franchisees to keep them motivated to use his intangible assets properly. 
 
9.9. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis different views on the choice of the level of formal control in franchise networks 
have been presented. Transaction cost theory and agency theory supplemented by the resource 
scarcity theory have served as the main theoretical basis for the research and development of 
hypotheses. 
According to transaction cost theory transaction costs are based on two behavioral assumptions 
(bounded rationality and opportunism) and possess two dimensions (asset specificity and 
uncertainty). These four features play an immense role in franchisor’s choice between different 
forms of governance. Relational governance and formal control through various monitoring 
mechanisms represent the two ways to deal with the danger of franchisee’s free-riding. In 
general, franchisor will seek to reduce transaction costs connected with the coordination of a 
franchise network. Such factors as asset specificity and high environmental/behavioral 
uncertainty increase the information asymmetry and as the result the monitoring costs of 
franchisor. The higher the costs of monitoring the franchise system the less formal control will 
be preferred. This hypothesis has also been supported by the empirical research used for this 
paper. Asset intangibility is closely associated with asset specificity. As it has been detected in 
the empirical research, asset intangibility to some extent contributes to the decrease in the use of 
formal control because it is an antecedent for increased monitoring costs. 
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It has been asserted by many scholars that franchisor-franchisee relationship represents a 
principal-agent model because two parties are interdependent and yet may pursue different and 
even conflicting goals. Thus, agency theory can be applied to investigate franchise systems. The 
agency theory highlights the same problems as transaction cost theory: information asymmetry, 
bounded rationality and danger of opportunism. But unlike transaction cost theory, agency 
theory suggests that more formal control through the franchise contract is more suitable to 
guarantee that franchisees use the intangible assets of franchisor properly. Nevertheless, the 6th 
hypothesis that was explained by the transaction cost theory and previewed a weaker use of 
formal control in connection with high asset intangibility has been weakly supported by the 
research, meaning that when franchisor’s asset intangibility is high he will apply less formal 
control. 
 
There are different methods to control the behavior of franchisees, which can be divided into 
formal control and relational forms of governance. Formal control implies strict enforcement of 
the franchise contract. Relational forms of governance include supporting activities, franchise 
partner selection and usage of master or area development franchising. Franchise partner 
selection is believed to be one of the most critical issues in the franchisor-franchisee relationship 
because at this stage franchisor decides whether it will be possible to build a relationship with 
franchisee based on trust and cooperation rather than on a regular enforcement of the franchise 
contract. 
 
In general, it is believed that the preference for less formal methods of control allows to build up 
strong communication between franchisor and franchisees, will motivate innovation in the 
franchise system and will allow franchisor to benefit from the local know-how of the franchisees, 
which is one of the reasons to use franchising instead of the establishment of company-owned 
outlets. 
 
10. Managerial Implications 
 
The theories used to explain franchising and the choice between the methods of control give an 
overview about the reasons to use franchising instead of company-owned subsidiaries and 
facilitate the decisions concerning which methods of control should be used in the day-to-day 
activities of the franchise system. 
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Franchising offers not only a possibility for companies to raise capital and speed up the 
expansion into international markets but also allows to reduce agency costs compared with the 
establishment of company-owned subsidiaries. When there is a great difference between 
activities in the domestic and foreign markets franchising should be preferred to company-owned 
outlets because it gives access to the local market knowledge and reduces the need in monitoring 
the behavior of a franchisee compared with an outlet manager. 
The choice between different methods of control should be made depending on the 
characteristics of the franchise system. Such factors as environmental and behavioral uncertainty, 
asset specificity and need in the local market knowledge must be taken into account. The main 
danger of franchising is the opportunistic behavior of franchisees. High intangibility of assets 
puts franchisor in front of a choice either to incur high monitoring costs and precisely control the 
behavior of franchisees or to build up a system of relational governance which will allow to co-
align the goals of franchisor and franchisees and to reduce the monitoring costs. The findings of 
the research (though weakly significant) have shown that franchisors used in the sample 
associated high asset intangibility with the need to use less formal control and give more 
decision rights to franchisees. 
Environmental uncertainty of the market is one of the factors that can influence the activities of a 
company dramatically. It increases the need in the local market knowledge and makes it more 
difficult to monitor and assess the performance of a franchisee. High levels of environmental 
uncertainty also increase the costs of adaptation of contractual agreements. High level of formal 
control would lead to higher transaction costs and lower flexibility of the franchise system. The 
assumption that higher environmental uncertainty will lead to decreased use of formal control 
hasn’t been supported by the empirical research. However, the study of Pilling et al. (1994) has 
shown that environmental uncertainty increases the costs of developing an exchange relationship 
but has no effect on the costs of monitoring such relationship (Pilling et al., 1994). So, it can be 
assumed that high environmental uncertainty makes franchisee selection process more accurate 
but once a relationship is established, it should be less governed by formal methods of control. 
Thus, all characteristics of a franchise system and its environment have to be assessed when 
deciding which type of control is to be used in relations with franchisees. However, taking into 
account that local market knowledge and flexibility are some of the most important reasons for 
the choice of franchising instead of company-owned outlets, franchisor should seek to develop a 
system of relational governance to benefit from the advantages of franchising to full extent.  
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12. Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit untersucht die Wahl der „Governance“-Methoden in Franchise-
Netzwerken. Die Transaktionskostentheorie, die Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie sowie die Theorie der 
Ressourcenknappheit, bilden die theoretische Basis für die empirische Untersuchung und 
Entwicklung von den Hypothesen.  
Bei der Wahl der „Governance“-Methoden wird hauptsächlich zwischen formeller und 
relationaler „Governance“ unterschieden. Formelle „Governance“ bedeutet eine detaillierte 
Regelung der Beziehung zwischen dem Franchisegeber und dem Franchisenehmer im 
Franchisevertrag. Relationale „Governance“ hingegen schließt verschiedene 
Unterstützungsmaßnahmen,  eine sorgfältige Wahl der Franchise-Partner und die Verwendung 
von Master-Franchising oder Gebietsentwicklung ein. 
In der Diplomarbeit wurden die Determinanten der formellen „Governance“ untersucht. Diese 
Determinanten sind: die Überwachungskosten; die Umweltunsicherheit; der Vorteil des lokalen 
Marktwissen; die Investitionsaufwendungen der Franchisenehmer am Anfang der 
Vertragsbeziehungen; die Bedeutung des Markennamen für den Wettbewerbsvorteil und die 
Intangibilität vom Know-how des Franchisegebers.  
Die Datenanalyse von 137 Fragebögen, die von Franchisegebern ausgefüllt worden sind, hat 
gezeigt, dass nur die Überwachungskosten einen starken negativen, statistisch signifikanten 
Einfluss auf die Ausübung der formellen „Governance“ haben. Dieses Ergebnis entspricht der 
Transaktionskostentheorie, die besagt, dass je höher die Überwachungskosten im Franchise-
Netzwerk sind, desto weniger wird formelle „Governance“ bevorzugt. Durch die empirische 
Untersuchung wurde auch eine negative Abhängigkeit der formellen „Governance“ von der 
Intangibilität des Know-hows des Franchisegebers festgestellt. Das kann dadurch erklärt werden, 
dass höhere Intangibilität vom Know-how des Franchisegebers die Überwachungskosten im 
Franchise-System erhöht. Der Einfluss der anderen, in der Studie verwendeten Determinanten 
auf die Wahl der „Governance“-Methoden konnte während der Untersuchung nicht bestätigt 
werden. 
Im Allgemeinen gilt, dass weniger formelle „Governance“ einen intensiveren 
Informationsaustausch und mehr Innovationen im Franchise-System fördert. So kann der 
Franchisegeber stärker von dem lokalen Marktwissen, das als Anreiz für den Aufbau des 
Franchise-Netzwerks dient, profitieren. 
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